In the past several weeks we have
identified several competing paradigms of international relations. We have
focused a lot on the terms: realism, liberalism, constructivism, feminism etc. In
several of these readings, we find further discussions of rhetorical significance.
In Anarchy is What States
Make of It, Alexander Wendt addresses society's role in constructing
meanings associated with words. He explains that actors give words their
meanings and these meanings amount to “collective meanings” which “organize our
actions (60).” Thus, the meanings we associate with individual words contribute
to the meanings of larger concepts, including our identities. Furthermore, our
understandings of larger concepts ultimately form our attitudes towards these concepts.
While Wendt addresses the authority words have over society, J.
Ann Tickner addresses the consequences of this authority in A Critique of Morganthau’s Principles of
Political Realism. Her chief example of the consequence of this authority
is a critique of Hans Morganthau's six principles of realism.
Tickner accuses Morganthau of projecting masculine understandings of words onto
society to explain how society functions. She accuses Morganthau of
misappropriating masculine understandings of human nature, morality, and most
alarmingly: objectivity.
When applying Wendt’s argument to Tickner’s, one sees that slanted
definitions of human nature, morality, or objectivity contribute to society’s
understanding or attitudes of more complex concepts. However, they are also the
result of society’s applied construction of other concepts or words. This
complexity is costly. It means the change or progression of any concept or word
cannot recover the objectivity of any other concept or word because everything
is interdependent. In response to Tickner, this realization also asserts that broadening
Morganthau’s six principles of realism to be more feminist would not cause his
overall argument to be more objective.
In fact, what is objectivity? If objectivity is subject to social construction –just as any other concept—and each of these concepts are either the product or component of a concept that is also subject to social construction, then any concept of objectivity collapses.
In fact, what is objectivity? If objectivity is subject to social construction –just as any other concept—and each of these concepts are either the product or component of a concept that is also subject to social construction, then any concept of objectivity collapses.
It is important for states to recognize how convoluted objectivity
is as they interact with other states. This should be the basis of their
rationale as they assess other states; as they evaluate who is the more
powerful; as they determine the consequences of their actions; as they voice who is and is not feminist. If States
were more aware of a lack of objectivity, perhaps they would be less confident
in their actions, and concrete terms such as realism, liberalism,
constructivism, feminism etc would become less concrete and allow more room for
outside opinion.