The Role of Honor in IR

Eliot Fenton

The Role of Honor in IR

During class last week, Professor Shirk decided to demonstrate a few of the games commonly used in game theory. The first game, prisoner’s paradox, did not yield the expected result. This is an important thing to note, and explanations for why most of the participants did not take the dominant path can be applied to international relations.

One potential explanation is that the students did not follow the dominant strategies because they were being watched. This supports the liberal theory that institutions (in this case, the rest of the class) can pressure states into cooperating. The liberalist theory states that the fear of institutional repercussions such as sanctions can help encourage states to cooperate. However, in a classroom setting, there are no sanctions that we can apply to students that do not cooperate. Therefore, in a sanction-free environment, the participants would be expected not to cooperate. Yet, they still cooperated. I argue that the reason states can cooperate has less to do with sanctions and more to do with honor, as Professor Shirk’s example demonstrates.

It is incredibly important for states to maintain their honor on the world stage. Honor contributes to a state’s validity and soft power, so states tend to pick the honorable option when in view of other states. This is why states seek UN clearance before invading each other. The tendency to act honorably was also demonstrated in class, as five of the six students chose to pass up the potential for an extra piece of candy to save face in front of the class. One student even claimed that by cooperating, he was “sticking to the code.” States act in a similar manner. For example, the US sought a coalition of states to help in the fight against ISIS. Most likely, the US has enough missiles to have the same general effect as a coalition would have. However, by involving multiple states, it gives the US’s actions validity and preserves the American honor. Cooperation is honorable, while solo action is frowned upon in international community. Thus, state honor breeds cooperation.

Honor can be applied to other situations as well. It’s the reason that the US refuses to negotiate with terrorist, and why most hostage situations turn into a game of chicken. Both sides could blink and they’d be relatively better off. However, they would much rather maintain their honor and supposed strength. In the Bo Bergdahl situation, many criticized President Obama’s actions because Al Qaeda received what appeared to be the better side of the deal. To them, the US’s absolute gains didn’t matter. All that mattered was the loss of honor associated with trading with terrorists. This kind of honor-first motivation is the root of most standoffs. Arguments between states often stalemate as the original disagreement becomes a proxy for a fight for honor. Eventually, the winnings don’t matter, and states are only worried about who the winner is.

States care deeply about the honor associated with every action. Acting in a dishonorable way can damage soft power and international prestige. Oftentimes, states will even value honor over concrete things such as money or hostages. Though we like to think honor is good because it can keep states from straying from “the code,” it can oftentimes go too far and further complicate situations.

Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic War in Iraq

 In his article Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council, Ian Hurd investigates the role and significance of legitimacy as it relates to states and the United Nations Security Council. Overall, he explains that ideas of legitimacy fuel states’ perceptions of one another. He further explains that symbols/ symbolic power “give rise” to ideas of such legitimacy. Ultimately, Hurd identifies that perceptions of legitimacy and the symbols that are used to construct these perceptions reveal the power of an organization. The most noteworthy observation Hurd makes in his argument is that “efforts to legitimize an institution naturally generate efforts by others to de-legitimize.” While the context of Hurd’s argument is international organizations, one can extend his logic beyond international organizations to include states.

Hurd’s assertion that the increasing legitimacy of one organization elicits reactions from other organizations to delegitimize the increasingly legitimate organization reflects the idea that power is “zero-sum.”  This is an especially appropriate connection to draft as Hurd relates legitimacy so closely with power --essentially saying the most legitimate organizations (while flawed) are the most powerful organizations.  He expresses when stating "the power of social institutions in a society is largely a function of the legitimacy of those institutions." Thus, to understand how his argument applies to states, it is sensible for one to examine an issue of preventative war, where one state engages in war with another state in effort to prevent that state from gaining power and consequently reducing another State’s power. The War in Iraq is a sufficient example.

It is said that the United States became involved in war with Iraq in response to rumors that Iraq was constructing a weapons of mass destruction program. The potential for these weapons symbolized an opportunity for Iraq to become more powerful. The idea of Iraq developing such weapons caused other nations, namely the United States of America, to perceive Iraq as a threat to the status they enjoyed. The attack of September 11^th was another symbol. It was a symbol that contributed to the legitimacy of the speculation that Iraq was creating weapons of mass destruction and also subtracted from the legitimacy of the United States. The United States looked vulnerable.

To prevent any further reduction of its own legitimacy, the United States reacted. This reaction further supports Hurd’s argument. When the United States is considered the stronger state, and Iraq is considered the weaker state, Hurd’s characterizations of strong and weak agents continues to suit the model of the War in Iraq. According to Hurd, “the strong… must back up the symbols with behaviors to react a certain way.”  Thus, the United States had to respond to Iraq’s threats. It had to do this both to maintain the perception that it was the strong state and to prevent an actual detriment to its power.

Conversely, Iraq satisfied the characteristics of a weaker state. According to Hurd, “weaker agents… manipulate, and subvert meaning of symbols.” Iraq manipulated the symbol of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq’s position on whether or not it possessed weapons of mass destruction became increasingly unclear because Iraq benefitted heavily from both the perceptions of allegedly producing and not producing these weapons. Its need to appeal to two audiences reveals weakness. 

Ultimately, the perceived legitimacy that Iraq once achieved began to falter as time passed and the United States was unable to uncover such weapons. This reiterates that legitimacy really is in fact just a matter of perception. Perhaps Iraq never had weapons of mass destruction and the legitimacy (and attention) it enjoyed was merely the result of ideas that it did. It’s scary that such significant determinations rely on mere perceptions.

Don't be MAD

Vishal Hemnani

GVPT 200

When it comes to the matter of nuclear weapons, there is great debate as to whether or not the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) holds true. Those who think it does believe that everyone should produce nuclear weapons, and that the capability to attack one another will lead to annihilation of all involved.  This will ultimately result in disarmament. If people choose not to attack, the fear that the other party can will lead to deterrence.  Despite potential positives, the idea of MAD would not be feasible in today’s world.

During the Cold War era, the US and Soviet Union arms race eventually lead to nuclear deterrence.  With modern day war shifting emphasis towards the Middle East, many factors influence whether or not all countries should be armed. Carl Sagan was concerned that irrational actors who possessed nuclear weapons would use them for ideological victories, rather than the tactical ones that MAD would suggest. With a country like Iran, for instance, there is great reason to believe that these weapons would be used to fight western influence. It is also important to consider the potential for growth in terrorism that would undoubtedly occur. In the Cold War, despite the desire for power, there was a tactical purpose to creating more weapons. It was assumed that the power would offset. The regions of war today are simply too volatile to allow nuclear weapons, as radical groups within each nation would lead to the opposite of what MAD aims for. If Iran or Syria gained nuclear power, so would ISIS. Two countries, India and Pakistan, realized that moving towards a nuclear war would result in great casualties. In 1991, they signed a treaty not to target each other’s nuclear facilities and since then, even during times of high tension, both countries have abided by their agreement. Now, say a country that is not bound by such an agreement faces the same tensions and chooses to use their nuclear weapons; we would then be presented with the world’s first nuclear war.

The founding ideal to MAD is that nuclear weapons are so destructive that rational leaders would be forced to think about the consequences before their use. The reality is that not every nation is lead by rational leaders. Irrational leaders only prioritize their own countries’ successes- if nuclear weapons can bring about a win, these leaders may not hesitate to engage these resources. MAD praises the opportunity of second strike attacking, claiming that if all countries are armed, all can retaliate. In reality, the country that strikes first will have the upper hand and the chance to attack will be rendered useless. Assume the Japanese had the ability to counter the US in WWII, and that they chose to bomb the U.S. afterwards. What is the end result? We now have two decimated nations that are disarmed, but at what cost? There is no incentive to second striking because no stability can come from this, only constant turmoil.

The biggest flaw with MAD is that it assumes individual nations will utilize nuclear weapons as a means of defense. In reality, a country’s agenda is unpredictable and ulterior motives will always trump cordial peace if everyone has the power to take actions into their own hands. For those who use their power to instigate, the presence of other weapons is not reason to refrain from attack. The world has never had a nuclear war because nations that have possessed nuclear weapons have been rational. Without rational thinking, the possession of nuclear weapons by all countries will only lead to easier and deadlier methods of war.

“What was that?” Andy Samberg asks in a fake speech to the UN General Assembly in 2010 SNL Digital Short. The video is silly and ridiculous. Samberg poses an awkward high school student who breaks out into song and dance while he disapprovingly asks world leaders to explain humanitarian atrocities. Despite its comedic purposes, the video actually raises a valid concern: does the UNGA serve its purpose? As an international organization, the United Nations aims to facilitate cooperation amongst nations. Yet it repeatedly fails to be effective. Because of its nature, it is dominated by more developed nations and therefore produces little change. However, there is one purpose that the UN General Assembly actually fulfills: it increases information.

There are several factors that influence the UN’s effectiveness. As the video proposes, the UNGA does not make efficient use of their time. Its size impedes cooperation, making it difficult to reach an agreement with over 190 members. Additionally each member has the ability to address the assembly. Despite each member nation having an equal vote, the agenda is typically set and controlled by stronger, more developed nations. In addition, the official agenda is usually overshadowed by current global crises so the scope of debate is limited to more visible broader issues. Furthermore, its resolutions are non-binding so they ultimately have little effect even when there is overwhelming support. For instance, the UNGA passed the twenty-third resolution to end the US embargo on Cuba this past September and despite the support from more than 90% the resolution had zero effect.

However, some would argue that the UNGA’s structure is actually better for facilitating cooperation. While the resolutions hold no barring on member nations, they are, in fact, important to international actors because they indicate a member state’s position on a given issue. Increased information helps facilitate cooperation among states because Speeches are another important function in the UNGA. Like resolutions, speeches can be an indicator of a state’s position, increasing one state’s knowledge of another’s position, but speeches can also increase public information. This can help raise awareness of an issue or cause. Emma Watson’s speech on feminism garnered huge international praise and helped launch UN Women’s HeForShe campaign.

Furthermore it should be noted that while a large membership would be a disadvantage during debate, it provides a wider range of perspectives and increases the likelihood a policy would be effective by implementing it on a larger scale. Powerful nations help provide legitimacy to an agreement and economic support. While binding agreements enforce change, non-binding agreements are easier to pass and states overall are more accepting of them.

In conclusion, the UN General Assembly has the ability to be effective and can, at times, facilitate cooperation through its various functions; however, it best serves its purpose as a platform to increase information both to international actors and the public at large. Increased information leads to better cooperation among states and an increased attention for prominent world issues.

http://www.thelonelyisland.com/video/what-was-that

Restructuring the UN Security Council

           The world has become an obviously different place than it was in 1945 when the United Nations was first formed, and with that requires changes to the world order. Since the Security Council was set up according to the winners of World War II, it is a clearly biased system that does not accurately represent the current world dynamics. While some world powers still retain a permanent seat, such as the US and China, the others may be on their way out of “world power” status. And if they are, then there should be new ones to take their place to be voted in by the general assembly.

            Looking ahead 200 years, the United Nations would not be an effective world organization if it still held the original five in the Security Council. Therefore, change must be considered now, because even 50 years from now there is going to be a need for it  if not sooner. The United Nations will not be able to exist unless serious transformation occurs. If it remains the same, it has the potential to suffer the same fate as the League of Nations, only to be replaced with some new organization that would make the alterations being proposed here. Within the next 20 years there should be this vote for new semi-permanent members, and every 50 years or so afterward there should be a revote by the general assembly for who remains in the Security Council veto seats. There should still be the other 10 rotating seats with two year terms to ensure that the international voice is heard.

The Security Council needs restructuring because if the permanent five get to make crucial decisions, then it should reflect the desires of those with the most power, much like the House in the United States Congress. Also following the example set by the House, there should be a guideline for each of the five “permanent” members to be a representative from their respective regions. This would be a set rule for the most part, but would allow for two from one region in an extreme situation. This is because since the Security Council deals mostly with issues of security, the best people to understand how to solve those issues are countries who are a part of that culture. Right now, there is an extreme imbalance with nearly all of the Security Council being a part of Europe. By allowing for two from one region, it prevents countries from joining who have no power on the world stage.

            Right now there is a lot of potential for new world powers to emerge, meaning that within the next 20 years there could be a new world dynamic. Potential Security Council members could include Brazil, India or Japan, while most likely retaining the US, China and Russia. Ultimately there is need for a change in the United Nations if it is to continue to be an effective and respected organization that can make a real difference. This change may be a few years off, but it needs to be considered now so that it does not get too complicated, too fast and a rash decision is made.

MAD

Connor Handzo

GVPT 200

Professor Shirk

Blog Post 3

            There is much debate over the theory of mutually assured destruction, or MAD. Many scholars argue that the theory is not convincing and therefore does not hold true. Then there are those who believe strongly in the effectiveness of MAD. MAD is a very valid theory and it has much support to back it up, yet this post will focus on one reason why MAD is such an effective theory.

            Mutually assured destruction is valid for quite a few reasons, but there is one piece of evidence that especially supports the theory. This such reason is that in the entire time that nuclear weapons have existed, there has never been a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are so massively destructive and have such severe consequences that any rational leader would be forced to think about such consequences. After deliberation, it is because of these dire costs that no leader has resorted to nuclear war. Even leaders considered to be crazed and mad such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong have never resorted to nuclear war. Joseph Stalin was extreme enough to kill millions of his own people without as much as a second thought. So one would think that a leader as maniacal as him would especially give no second thought to starting a nuclear war; however, even the consequences of nuclear war were enough to deter Stalin and to make him not start one.

            One of these such consequences that would have deterred Stalin from starting a nuclear war is second strike capability. This is the ability to launch a nuclear attack after being attacked yourself, or in retaliation. Also, along these same lines the retaliation would most likely be aimed at cities, which sadly might not deter someone like Stalin as he killed millions of his own people, or the retaliation could be directed at nuclear facilities. The threat of a launch at Stalin’s nuclear facilities would indeed deter him from launching a nuclear weapon in the first place. This is because destroying a nuclear facility would threaten Stalin’s ability to launch any more weapons, yet the other side would be able to continue launching weapons. This is one reason why Stalin, who many consider to be a mad man, did not launch any nuclear weapons and start a nuclear war.

            MAD is a very effective and valid theory. Many mad men in the past have had the ability to start a nuclear war against their enemies, yet they did not. This is due to MAD and the dire consequences that would ensue after starting a nuclear war. These leaders have understood these consequences and that is why, even though they had done many atrocious acts during their leadership, did not start a devastating nuclear war. MAD has an explanation for any man as to why he has not or will not start a nuclear war.