Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic War in Iraq

 In his article Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council, Ian Hurd investigates the role and significance of legitimacy as it relates to states and the United Nations Security Council. Overall, he explains that ideas of legitimacy fuel states’ perceptions of one another. He further explains that symbols/ symbolic power “give rise” to ideas of such legitimacy. Ultimately, Hurd identifies that perceptions of legitimacy and the symbols that are used to construct these perceptions reveal the power of an organization. The most noteworthy observation Hurd makes in his argument is that “efforts to legitimize an institution naturally generate efforts by others to de-legitimize.” While the context of Hurd’s argument is international organizations, one can extend his logic beyond international organizations to include states.

Hurd’s assertion that the increasing legitimacy of one organization elicits reactions from other organizations to delegitimize the increasingly legitimate organization reflects the idea that power is “zero-sum.”  This is an especially appropriate connection to draft as Hurd relates legitimacy so closely with power --essentially saying the most legitimate organizations (while flawed) are the most powerful organizations.  He expresses when stating "the power of social institutions in a society is largely a function of the legitimacy of those institutions." Thus, to understand how his argument applies to states, it is sensible for one to examine an issue of preventative war, where one state engages in war with another state in effort to prevent that state from gaining power and consequently reducing another State’s power. The War in Iraq is a sufficient example.

It is said that the United States became involved in war with Iraq in response to rumors that Iraq was constructing a weapons of mass destruction program. The potential for these weapons symbolized an opportunity for Iraq to become more powerful. The idea of Iraq developing such weapons caused other nations, namely the United States of America, to perceive Iraq as a threat to the status they enjoyed. The attack of September 11^th was another symbol. It was a symbol that contributed to the legitimacy of the speculation that Iraq was creating weapons of mass destruction and also subtracted from the legitimacy of the United States. The United States looked vulnerable.

To prevent any further reduction of its own legitimacy, the United States reacted. This reaction further supports Hurd’s argument. When the United States is considered the stronger state, and Iraq is considered the weaker state, Hurd’s characterizations of strong and weak agents continues to suit the model of the War in Iraq. According to Hurd, “the strong… must back up the symbols with behaviors to react a certain way.”  Thus, the United States had to respond to Iraq’s threats. It had to do this both to maintain the perception that it was the strong state and to prevent an actual detriment to its power.

Conversely, Iraq satisfied the characteristics of a weaker state. According to Hurd, “weaker agents… manipulate, and subvert meaning of symbols.” Iraq manipulated the symbol of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq’s position on whether or not it possessed weapons of mass destruction became increasingly unclear because Iraq benefitted heavily from both the perceptions of allegedly producing and not producing these weapons. Its need to appeal to two audiences reveals weakness. 

Ultimately, the perceived legitimacy that Iraq once achieved began to falter as time passed and the United States was unable to uncover such weapons. This reiterates that legitimacy really is in fact just a matter of perception. Perhaps Iraq never had weapons of mass destruction and the legitimacy (and attention) it enjoyed was merely the result of ideas that it did. It’s scary that such significant determinations rely on mere perceptions.