The Role of Honor in IR

Eliot Fenton

The Role of Honor in IR

During class last week, Professor Shirk decided to demonstrate a few of the games commonly used in game theory. The first game, prisoner’s paradox, did not yield the expected result. This is an important thing to note, and explanations for why most of the participants did not take the dominant path can be applied to international relations.

One potential explanation is that the students did not follow the dominant strategies because they were being watched. This supports the liberal theory that institutions (in this case, the rest of the class) can pressure states into cooperating. The liberalist theory states that the fear of institutional repercussions such as sanctions can help encourage states to cooperate. However, in a classroom setting, there are no sanctions that we can apply to students that do not cooperate. Therefore, in a sanction-free environment, the participants would be expected not to cooperate. Yet, they still cooperated. I argue that the reason states can cooperate has less to do with sanctions and more to do with honor, as Professor Shirk’s example demonstrates.

It is incredibly important for states to maintain their honor on the world stage. Honor contributes to a state’s validity and soft power, so states tend to pick the honorable option when in view of other states. This is why states seek UN clearance before invading each other. The tendency to act honorably was also demonstrated in class, as five of the six students chose to pass up the potential for an extra piece of candy to save face in front of the class. One student even claimed that by cooperating, he was “sticking to the code.” States act in a similar manner. For example, the US sought a coalition of states to help in the fight against ISIS. Most likely, the US has enough missiles to have the same general effect as a coalition would have. However, by involving multiple states, it gives the US’s actions validity and preserves the American honor. Cooperation is honorable, while solo action is frowned upon in international community. Thus, state honor breeds cooperation.

Honor can be applied to other situations as well. It’s the reason that the US refuses to negotiate with terrorist, and why most hostage situations turn into a game of chicken. Both sides could blink and they’d be relatively better off. However, they would much rather maintain their honor and supposed strength. In the Bo Bergdahl situation, many criticized President Obama’s actions because Al Qaeda received what appeared to be the better side of the deal. To them, the US’s absolute gains didn’t matter. All that mattered was the loss of honor associated with trading with terrorists. This kind of honor-first motivation is the root of most standoffs. Arguments between states often stalemate as the original disagreement becomes a proxy for a fight for honor. Eventually, the winnings don’t matter, and states are only worried about who the winner is.

States care deeply about the honor associated with every action. Acting in a dishonorable way can damage soft power and international prestige. Oftentimes, states will even value honor over concrete things such as money or hostages. Though we like to think honor is good because it can keep states from straying from “the code,” it can oftentimes go too far and further complicate situations.